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Symposium: Federal Sentencing Reform
Ten Years After United States v. Booker
Introduction
Rory K. Little*
Senior District Judge Charles R. Breyer began his career, upon
graduation from the law school across the Bay, by clerking for U.S.
District Chief Judge Oliver Carter. He was then an Assistant District
Attorney in San Francisco for about six years. Subsequently, and he can
tell you the story if you’d like to hear it, he got a phone call asking him to
join some obscure group that was just being formed in Washington D.C.,
called something like the Watergate Special Prosecutors Task Force. He
took that opportunity, having been advised by local mentors, “Don’t go
there, that’s a dead end.” It was quite a good experience for him.
Later Judge Breyer returned to San Francisco to enter private
practice and specialize as a white-collar criminal defense attorney,
ultimately becoming a named partner in the firm of Coblentz, Cahen,
McCabe & Breyer. He also served as the First Assistant District Attorney
to District Attorney Joe Frietas. Finally, he was appointed to the district
court in 1997 by President Clinton and has served since that time.
In addition to overseeing the normal district court docket, Judge
Breyer has served as a judge on the judicial conference’s Multidistrict
Litigation Panel. He has served on influential other advisory groups,
including some international legal advisory groups. And he currently
serves as Vice Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. So he is
particularly well positioned to talk to us about our topic today: federal
sentencing reform. I have had the pleasure of introducing Judge Breyer a
few other times, because for six or seven years he has taught federal
criminal law here at Hastings with me. Sadly, the President stole him and
put him on the Sentencing Commission, so we have lost him—temporarily
at least—as an adjunct professor here.
Judge Breyer has had many prominent cases as district judge, a
number of which have gone to the Supreme Court. This is either a good or
* Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco.

[1525]

H1 - BREYER_11 (HAMILTON)-REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

1526

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

8/27/2015 9:12 PM

[Vol. 66:1525

a bad thing, depending on how you count the votes, because his brother
generally recuses when the case has come from Judge Breyer. Judge
Breyer also did a lot of theater when he was in college; I think you will
see the evidence of that. And something else that I think is true about
District Judge Chuck Breyer, whether he would agree or not, is that he
could have been on the Ninth Circuit any day that he wanted to. His
political connections were strong enough. The politics were right.
Nevertheless, he has always decided to stay on the district court because
that is where the action is, that is where the law is made, and that is
where the real litigation happens. I think that good judgment is reflective
of his character. And I am personally very pleased that he has stayed on
the district court in this district.
Without further ado, please welcome one of the most prominent
U.S. District Judges in the United States, Chuck Breyer.
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Keynote Address: Federal Sentencing Reform
Ten Years After United States v. Booker
University of California
Hastings College of the Law, February 13, 2015
Hon. Charles R. Breyer*
Thank you very much, Rory. That was a generous introduction. I
think there are two things I would say about it. First, you will see evidence
in the next half hour of why I did not become an actor. Second, Rory has
the task this afternoon of moderating a panel of district court judges; I
cannot imagine a harder task than that.
I want to address a question that has been discussed this morning
and will be discussed again this afternoon. It is the question of whether the
Sentencing Guidelines are relevant today, under an advisory system—the
1
so-called post-Booker era. It will not come as a surprise to you that I
believe that they are extremely relevant and vitally important to sentencing
judges today. In order to test that belief, I suggest that you look at
sentencing before the guidelines were enacted.
As Professor Little remarked, I had the privilege of co-teaching
Federal Criminal Law at Hastings for a number of years. It was my
assignment to give the lecture on sentencing. I started my lecture with a
hypothetical. Giving the students a piece of paper, I would say:
You are now a federal district court judge in 1984, and you have before
you a defendant. Let me tell you about his conviction. He is an armed
bank robber who took $20,000 from the bank, and he has one prior
felony conviction. So please tell me what sentence, in number of
months, you would impose.

I would tell them not to look at each other’s paper, that I was
seeking their individual opinion as the district court judge. I would assure
them that they were not going to be appealed. They would write down
their sentence. Then I would add several facts, like that the defendant
pled guilty. And still more, like that the defendant informed on his
co-defendants and rendered substantial assistance to the prosecution. I
added, too, that the defendant served as the lookout in this case; he
* Senior District Judge, Northern District of California; Vice Chair of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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didn’t actually go into the bank. I asked the students if these facts would
change their sentence. Then I would add that the defendant is a drug
addict, came from an impoverished background, and has been given no
advantages in life—no decent education, no stable family life, no viable
employment opportunities. And I asked whether, and if so how, that
changed their sentences. Finally, I would say, “Here’s another fact—he
stole not out of greed. He did it only because he needed to support his
family.”
I then tabulated the results. And do you know what the range in
sentencing was? It was everything from probation to ten years. Some of
these added facts had an impact, and some did not. One student would
reason, “A snitch? Someone who cooperates with the government? I’m
not going to give him credit for that. You don’t want a system like that.”
Another would argue, “A snitch? Of course he should receive a lighter
sentence. How are you going to prosecute cases without someone who is
willing to inform on what happened? It makes a big difference in my
sentencing calculation.”
One student would question why the defendant would plead guilty:
“We have a system where people can go to trial, so why should they be
encouraged to plead guilty?” Another would observe that guilty pleas
serve the interests of the court: “You can’t try every single case. There
are 85,000 cases a year—how are you going to have 85,000 trials? There
are only 960 federal judges.”
There was great divergence of opinion among thirty Hastings law
students as to the appropriate sentence and the appropriate factors to
consider. There were highly individualized views as to how to sentence
this individual who went into the bank with a gun, stole $20,000, and had
one prior felony conviction.
It is not just Hastings students who have these different opinions.
Prior to 1984, the federal judiciary had exactly the same divergent views
and practices as the Hastings students. They were all over the lot. This
wide disparity caught the attention of two U.S. Senators: Strom Thurmond
and Ted Kennedy. You could not have two people who differed more in
their views as to political philosophies, ideologies, and criminal justice.
Yet they thought, as did the rest of the Senate Judiciary Committee and,
ultimately, the Senate and House, that there was something inappropriate
about individuals with the same criminal past receiving very different
sentences for the same criminal conduct, whether they were from Omaha,
Nebraska; San Francisco, California; or Ho-Ho-Kus, New Jersey. Those
different outcomes were unfair because these defendants violated the
same federal law. Therefore the defendants’ sentences, while they need
not be identical, should be roughly the same, irrespective of the location of
their courthouse, provided that their crimes share common relevant
characteristics.
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Thus, in 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, and the
3
Sentencing Commission was established. The Commission was directed
to do a number of things. First, it was directed to set federal sentencing
guidelines on a nationwide basis for all federal crimes. That might sound like
a big task, and it was. The bipartisan Commission, made up of seven
members, met for a year to address this task. And do you know what
happened? Nothing! Why? Because the Commissioners constantly argued
as follows:
Well, I think bank robbery is a very dangerous crime—yes indeed. But
is it worse than child pornography? After all, child pornography takes
young people and victimizes them. If you think that’s bad, what about
someone who dumps a pollutant into the San Francisco Bay and
poisons people? Is it terrible? Yes, but what about tax evasion? Just
think, someone doesn’t pay their taxes, and word gets out that you’re
not going to be punished for not paying taxes, guess what’s going to
happen?

This went on and on. They couldn’t agree as to relative lengths of sentences.
They did, however, agree on one thing, and it was this: there was a historical
record as to how judges, over ten years, have sentenced defendants in the
federal system.
Making use of the historical record, the Commission embarked on a
study of 10,000 sentences. From that study, the Commission distilled what
has become known as “the heartland” for all federal criminal offenses.
For example, armed bank robbers with a prior felony who take $20,000
were sentenced, by and large, to a particular range of sentences. Then
the Commission recognized that the heartland sentence is for the
ordinary case. But judges not infrequently face cases that are not ordinary,
that are very different from the heartland of cases. As to those cases, the
Commission envisioned a system of departures. But the Commission
decided it would tell judges what is and is not a legitimate departure, so
that departures would be uniformly applied. The system would also be
mandatory. That is, judges had to follow this system and had to impose
4
sentences within this range, or justify a sentence outside of the heartland.
Of course, several wrenches were thrown into the process. Perhaps
the major wrench was mandatory minimums. In 1986, Congress came to
believe that some judges were not sentencing defendants to prison for
appropriate periods of time given the magnitude of the crime committed,
especially in the areas of drugs and guns. Congress told judges that they

2. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
3. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1988).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000). The Supreme Court later severed and excised this provision
from the statute. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
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have to impose a minimum sentence in these areas. Then, of course,
further problems surfaced. One problem was that the testimonies of
some defendants were absolutely vital to the prosecution of the case;
unless they rendered substantial assistance to the government, there
would be no prosecution. But if the guidelines required judges to
sentence a cooperating defendant to the mandatory minimum, goodbye
cooperation. So the Department of Justice told Congress that there
should be a departure from the mandatory minimums to employ one of
the most effective law enforcement tools. Thus, a provision for departure
on this basis was enacted; if a defendant renders substantial assistance,
6
then judges do not have to impose the mandatory minimum,
notwithstanding the fact that it will result in disparate sentences.
The second task of the Commission was to gather current statistical
information on sentencing. Every year, U.S. federal courts sentence
approximately 85,000 federal defendants. If you visit the office of the
Sentencing Commission in Washington D.C., you will see a team of
people coding—breaking down all of the sentences imposed according to
all of the factors the courts considered important to their determinations.
The result of this effort has been an enormously useful and detailed
account of what judges today are doing and have done in the recent past
in connection with sentencing. This can be analyzed on a nationwide
basis, on a circuit-wide basis, and on a district-wide basis.
Now, I know that this symposium today is a symposium about what
happened after Booker when the mandatory guideline system became an
“advisory” system. It will be said by some speakers, even me, that it has
had a significant impact on sentencing. But the change to an advisory
system has not had as dramatic an impact as you might think. You might
believe that with an advisory system, judges now give any sentence they
want. Not so. The Supreme Court post-Booker told district judges that
they may vary from the guidelines sentence but, in doing so, they must
give their reasoning for the variance, and they must look at the statute,
which is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This statute identifies seven factors. And
courts must use those factors in determining the appropriate sentence,
and give their reasons for it. So courts may vary, but before they do so,
7
they still must set the correct sentencing guideline range. Why did the
Supreme Court say that? Well, I believe that it wanted judges to use the
Sentencing Guidelines as an anchor. Judges then decide (absent a

5. E.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
7. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (“[T]o secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines
should be the starting point and the initial benchmark. . . . [A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to
argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the §
3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.”).
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mandatory minimum) whether to go down or up, and they must give their
reasons for doing so.
Another important aspect of the Sentencing Reform Act was the
provision of a process for amending the guidelines. Congress told the
Commission to look at what judges are doing, and then decide whether it
is appropriate to change the guideline range, or the factors to be considered
by a judge, in light of their collective experience. Thus, in each year of its
operation, the Sentencing Commission meets, sets priorities, and then
offers amendments to the guidelines, which—with public notice and
absent congressional action—change the guidelines. Two examples of such
changes are particularly relevant to our discussion today.
The first example is drugs. The courts’ experience relating to drug
use and trafficking in the ongoing war on drugs demonstrated over time
that the federal sentencing scheme in this area was overly harsh, not
working, and needed to be reexamined to determine whether guideline
sentences were accomplishing the statutory purposes of sentencing. The
Commission focused on the evidence regarding recidivism in this area—
do longer sentences impact recidivism? Fortunately, an earlier reduction
in drug sentences involving crack cocaine had reduced the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine, which provided some evidentiary
insight into the question. A 2010 statutory amendment reduced this
8
disparity from 100:1 to 18:1 and made the change potentially retroactive.
The Commission recommended, as a matter of policy, that the
reduction be retroactive, with the proviso that the sentencing judge
retains discretion over whether to give the benefit of a lower sentence to
an already-sentenced defendant. With that, judges across the country
were confronted with the choice of whether to lower a particular
defendant’s sentence. Some judges did and some did not. Accordingly,
there were two distinct groups of people: those whose sentences were
reduced and those whose sentences were not. The Sentencing Commission
followed both groups to see whether there was a higher rate of recidivism
among those who served the shorter sentence. The result? There was no
9
statistical difference in the rate of recidivism between these two groups.
The lowering of a sentence would not necessarily increase the risk of
recidivism. The two groups were equally likely, statistically, to commit
another offense, or to be in violation of their supervised release. This
finding called into question whether the length of sentence necessarily
protects society from recidivist behavior.

8. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).
9. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2014 Annual Report A-7 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/2014-Annual-Report.pdf.
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This study became the basis for making retroactive the “Drugs
10
Minus Two” amendment enacted by the Sentencing Commission last year.
As you may know, the Commission voted unanimously—Democrats and
Republicans—to make the reduction retroactive at the option of the
sentencing judge. In its wake, that decision brought about a serious concern
over the length of all drug sentences, for if there is no real difference in
the danger to the community whether someone serves sixteen years
instead of fourteen years, or five years instead of three years, then you
might have to rethink the role that the length of imprisonment at the
high end of the guideline range plays in connection with the safety of the
community. As I said, the Commission unanimously voted for retroactivity.
Who did that affect? Approximately 46,000 federal inmates who were now
11
potentially eligible for a reduction in their sentence.
This process encouraged the Commission to embark upon a multi12
year study of recidivism. We are right in the middle of that now. We
want to know the evidentiary answers to the questions that we should have
asked years ago, such as: What are the factors that contribute to
recidivism? And what impact does a particular length of sentence have
on those factors? That will be a very interesting study when it comes out,
and the Commission has no prejudgment on those issues. Although I
have been told that factors such as age play some sort of role (this is very
welcoming to me at age seventy-three—perhaps I have aged out of the
criminal process; fortunately I have not aged out of the judicial process).
So one issue is whether you want to treat a person who is seventy-three
years old differently from how you treat a person who is eighteen or
twenty-five. Congress originally told the Sentencing Commission that age
should be a prohibited factor to be considered in sentencing. But doesn’t
that fly in the face of experience? Moreover, there may be many ways to
address the fairness issue. Is it unfair to treat two people who commit the
same crime—one who is twenty-five and one who is seventy-three—
differently in terms of the length of their sentences? It depends on what
you want to accomplish by the sentence. It is complicated. But you do
have to know the facts and the evidence before you start to amend the
guidelines. That is where the gathering of information by the Commission
aids us in making the guidelines relevant.

10. Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,973 (Aug. 1, 2014).
11. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Unanimously Votes to
Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences 1 (July 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140718_press_release.pdf.
See Clemency Project 2014, https://clemencyproject2014.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (project
designed to implement this change with dozens of volunteer lawyers).
12. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Selects Policy
Priorities for 2014–2015 Guidelines Amendment Cycle 2 (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140814_Press_Release.pdf.
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The second example of potential changes to the guidelines is in the
area of fraud. I have to be somewhat circumspect because the Commission
13
has yet to adopt proposed changes to the guidelines. A number of the
proposed changes come from white-collar practitioners who argue that
the measurements for white-collar offenders in terms of loss, victim
impact, and other factors do not make sense in the majority of cases.
It is my personal opinion that their concerns are valid. When we
received these proposals at the Commission, we did what we do in every
case. We asked, “What is the evidence? What are the facts? How are judges
treating white-collar offenders?” The staff looked at years of sentencing
in white-collar cases. As you may know if you’ve studied the guidelines
in this area, the driving force—perhaps the principal driving force—is
loss. The staff found that more than fifty percent of cases sentenced
under the guidelines involved a loss of $120,000 or less, and eighty-two
14
percent involved a loss of $1 million or less. Thus, the vast majority of
cases involving the fraud guidelines deal with relatively small losses.
Given that the majority of fraud cases fall into these lower
categories, you might ask what judges do as to sentences in this area. The
answer was interesting. It appears that the recommended guideline
sentence and the imposed sentence (that is, what judges actually did)
move in parallel, closely tracking each other until you reach more than
$1 million in losses. At that point, the judges vary significantly downward
from the recommended guideline range. This suggested to the Commission
that maybe the guidelines at those lower levels were not broken. They
were consistent with the judges’ practices, until losses exceeded $1
million. As a result, we proposed amendments to address some other
concerns such as victim impact, mitigating role, and fraud on the market,
but did not offer a general rewriting of the guidelines. I am sure we will
hear from practitioners, from the Department of Justice, and from judges
as to whether they think that these proposed changes make sense.
But my point is this: we try in our Commission deliberations not to
base our decisions just on philosophy, because there might be as many
different philosophies as there are Commissioners. Nor do we make
decisions based solely upon our own innate sense of whether they are fair
or proportional, because each Commissioner has their own sense of what
is fair or proportional. We base our decisions, in the first instance, on the
statistical information of what judges are doing. And that process goes back

13. Two months after this symposium, the Commission voted to adopt changes to the fraud guidelines.
See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts Economic Crime
Amendments (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-newsadvisories/press-releases/20150409_Press_Release.pdf.
14. Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Apr.
2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Theft_
Property_Destruction_ Fraud_FY14.pdf.
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to the very methodology employed in drafting the first set of guidelines in
1984: consulting the experience of judges.
Recently, our Commission conducted a survey of all federal district
court judges and asked, “Do you believe that the advisory guidelines
structure that we have today best achieves the purposes of punishment?”
15
Seventy-seven percent responded in the affirmative. That’s a pretty high
percentage, when you think about it—frequently you can’t get judges to
agree on anything, as Professor Little will be reminded of later this
afternoon. So I am not here to tell you that this advisory system works in
all cases or achieves absolute uniformity; in the final analysis, individual
judges have to use individual judgments because they are sentencing
individual defendants. That discretion cannot and should not be taken
away from them. But it is not true that in an advisory system every judge
simply should use that judge’s own sense of what appropriate sentences are,
because when we had that system, federal judges, just like Hastings law
students, gave wildly disparate sentences to similarly situated defendants.
That did not promote justice. For these reasons, I think the guidelines are
highly relevant today, and I would encourage all of my colleagues to treat
them with seriousness. The Supreme Court has told us to do so.
Thank you very much.

15. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Results of 2014 Survey of United States District Judges:
Modification and Revocation of Probation and Supervised Release 30 (2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/
20150225_Judges_Survey. pdf.

